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Abstract—Formal methods have proved their usefulness
for analysing the security of protocols. In such a setting,
privacy-type security properties (e.g. vote-privacy, anonymity,
unlinkability) that play an important role in many modern
applications are formalised using a notion of equivalence.
In this paper, we study the notion of trace equivalence
and we show how to establish such an equivalence relation
in a modular way. It is well-known that composition works
well when the processes do not share secrets. However, there
is no result allowing us to compose processes that rely on
some shared secrets such as long term keys. We show that
composition works even when the processes share secrets
provided that they satisfy some reasonable conditions. Our
composition result allows us to prove various equivalence-based
properties in a modular way, and works in a quite general
setting. In particular, we consider arbitrary cryptographic
primitives and processes that use non-trivial else branches.
As an example, we consider the ICAO e-passport standard,
and we show how the privacy guarantees of the whole ap-
plication can be derived from the privacy guarantees of its
sub-protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the emergence of new systems and services like
electronic IDs and passports, electronic payment systems
and loyalty schemes, electronic tickets like the Navigo pass
in Paris or the Oyster card in London, or telecommunica-
tion systems like mobile phones, new privacy and security
concerns arise. Indeed, governments, ﬁnancial and transport
organisations, or telecommunication companies, all possess
and manage important amounts of information concerning
all of our everyday activities. As often reported by the
media [1], [2], [3], this exposes us to a number of privacy
threats. Security mechanisms should thus secure the offered
services, ensuring the conﬁdentiality of the gathered data
and enhancing the privacy of users’ identity and behaviour.
To this effect, many cryptographic protocols have been
designed to prevent third parties from identifying messages
as coming from a particular user. For example, mobile phone
operators identify mobile phones using temporary identities
that are periodically and securely updated to prevent mobile
phones from being traceable. The electronic passports also
include mechanisms that do not let the passport’s chip
disclose private information to external users. However,
the design of protocols that meet particular security re-
quirements is a notoriously difﬁcult and error prone task.
Indeed, numerous deployed protocols have subsequently
been found to be ﬂawed. For example, the BAC protocol
of electronic passports makes it possible to recognise a
previously observed passport, potentially enabling tracking
passport holders [4], [5].
In this context, formal methods have proved their useful-
ness for precisely analysing the security guarantees provided
by a protocol. Several techniques have been developed
for [6], [7], and successfully applied to the analysis of
cryptographic protocols [8], [5]. For example, a ﬂaw has
been discovered (see [9]) in the Single-Sign-On protocol
used e.g. by Google Apps. It has been shown that a malicious
application could very easily access to any other application
(e.g. Gmail or Google Calendar) of their users. This ﬂaw
has been found when analysing the protocol using formal
methods, abstracting messages by a term algebra and using
the AVISPA platform [10]. However, existing techniques for
analysing protocols with respect to privacy-type properties
(e.g. [11], [7]), consider protocols to be executed in isolation,
i.e. without taking into account other protocols which may
be running in parallel. But in reality many applications run
in parallel and the underlying protocols may interact in
unexpected ways if cryptographic material is shared amongst
them. This situation can arise if, for example, a user chooses
the same password for two different network services, or a
server uses the same key for different protocols.
Furthermore, real life protocols are usually complex
and composed of several sub-protocols that rely on the
same cryptographic material. For example, the UMTS stan-
dard [12], [13], [14] speciﬁes tens of sub-protocols running
in parallel in 3G mobile phone systems. And, while one
may hope to automatically verify each of these sub-protocols
in isolation, it is unrealistic to expect that the whole suite
of protocols can be automatically checked. Indeed, due to
computational constraints, existing tools and techniques do
not scale up well to such large systems, and it is often the
case that the sub-components have do be considered and
analysed independently.
Unfortunately, security proofs of network services or
protocols considered in isolation, do not carry over when
they share keys or passwords. Consider for example the two
naive protocols:
P : A → S : {A}r
pk(S) Q : A → S : {Na}
r
pk(S)
S → A : Na
In protocol P , the agent A simply identiﬁes himself to the
server S by sending him his identity encrypted under S’s
public key (using a probabilistic encryption scheme). In
protocol Q, the agent sends some fresh nonce Na encrypted
under S’s public key. The server S acknowledges A’s
message by forwarding A’s nonce. While P executed alone
guarantees A’s anonymity, it is not the case when the
protocol Q is run in parallel. Indeed, an adversary may use Q
as an oracle to decrypt any message. More realistic examples
illustrating interactions between protocols can be found in
e.g. [15].
In order to enable veriﬁcation of complex real life sys-
tems, composition theorems for modular reasoning about
security and privacy are therefore desirable. They may allow
one to deduce security guarantees for a complex protocol,
from the security guarantees of the individual sub-protocols.
The goal of our paper is to study the composition of
protocols with respect to privacy-type properties.
Related work: There are a number of papers studying
the secure composition of security protocols in the symbolic
model (e.g. [16], [17]) and in the computational model
(e.g. [18], [19]). Our result clearly belongs to the ﬁrst
approach.
Actually, a lot of results have been established for trace-
based security property, e.g. [16], [20], [21]. A result closely
related to ours is the one of S. Ciobaca and V. Cortier [17].
Their result holds for any cryptographic primitives that can
be modelled using equational theories, and their main result
transforms any attack trace of the combined protocol into an
attack trace of one of the individual protocols. This allows
various ways of combining protocols such as sequentially
or in parallel, possibly with inner replications. However,
the major difference with our result is that they consider
trace-based security properties, and more precisely secrecy
(encoded as a reachability property).
Regarding equivalence-based properties, it has been
shown that composition works for resistance against guess-
ing attacks in the passive case without any additional hy-
pothesis [22], and in the active case when the protocols
are tagged [22], [23]. However, these composition results
assume that passwords are the only shared secrets and are
not well-suited to analyse privacy-type properties such as
anonymity and unlinkability.
Our work is also related to those of Canetti et al. who,
in the context of computational models, study universal
composability of protocols [18]. This approach consists of
deﬁning for each sub-protocol an ideal functionality and then
showing that a certain implementation securely emulates
the ideal functionality. Since this initial work, the universal
composability framework has been improved in several
ways, e.g. with joint states [24], without pre-established
session identiﬁers [19].
Our contributions: While most existing papers study-
ing compositionality of protocols consider trace-based prop-
erties (covering conﬁdentiality and authentication require-
ments), our work tackles the compositionality problem with
respect to privacy-type properties which are usually ex-
pressed as equivalences between processes. Roughly, two
processes P and Q are equivalent (P ≈ Q) if no process O
can observe any difference between the processes P and Q.
We identify sufﬁcient conditions of disjointness under
which protocols can “safely” be executed in parallel. In
particular, we require protocols run in parallel not to use the
same primitives. Our theorems hold for arbitrary primitives
that can be modelled by a set of equations, and can thus
handle composition of protocols relying on symmetric and
asymmetric encryption schemes, hash functions, signatures,
zero knowledge proofs, message authentication codes, des-
ignated veriﬁer proofs, exclusive or, etc.
We ﬁrst state a composition result that also allows the
protocols considered to share the usual cryptographic primi-
tives of symmetric and asymmetric encryption, hashing, and
signing, provided that these primitives are tagged and that
public and veriﬁcation keys are not derivable. In this setting,
we are able to establish a strong result that basically says
that the disjoint scenario is equivalent to the shared one. This
allows us to go back to the disjoint case (with no shared key)
for which composition works unsurprisingly well.
Then, we further relax this condition. A second theorem
shows that it is possible to compose protocols that share
public and veriﬁcation keys even if those are known by
that attacker, provided that they are given to him from the
beginning.
In both cases, we show that whenever processes P and Q
(resp. P ′ and Q′) satisfy the corresponding disjointness
property, we can derive that P and Q running in parallel un-
der the composition context C[ ] are equivalent to P ′ and Q′
running in parallel under the composition context C ′[ ], i.e.
C[P | Q] ≈ C ′[P ′ | Q′]
from the equivalences C[P ] ≈ C ′[P ′] and C[Q] ≈ C ′[Q′].
The composition context under which two processes are
composed contains the shared keys possibly under some
replications.
We illustrate the application of our results on a case
study. We consider the protocols speciﬁed in the e-passport
application [13], and show how the privacy guarantees of
the whole application can be derived from the privacy
guarantees of the individual e-passport protocols.
Due to lack of space, proofs are omitted, but they can be
found in [25].
II. MODELS FOR SECURITY PROTOCOLS
In this section, we introduce the cryptographic process
calculus that we will use for describing protocols. This
calculus is close to the applied pi calculus as deﬁned in [26].
However, we use a slightly different syntax and we give
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a non-compositional semantics that is easier to manipulate
than its compositional counterpart as deﬁned in [26].
A. Messages
A protocol consists of some agents communicating on
a network. The messages sent by the agents are modelled
using an abstract term algebra. For this, we assume an
inﬁnite set of names N which is split into the set B =
{a, b, k, n, . . .} of names of base type (which are used
for representing keys, nonces, . . . ) and the set Ch =
{c, c1, ch, ch1, . . .} of names of channel type (which are
used to name communication channels). We also consider
a set of variables X = {x, y, . . .}, and a signature Σ
consisting of a ﬁnite set of function symbols. We rely on
a sort system for terms. The details of the sort system are
unimportant, as long as the base type differ from the channel
type. Moreover, we consider in addition the type seed. This
is a subsort of base type, and we will assume that this set
only contains atomic data, i.e. variables and names. As in
the applied pi calculus, we suppose that function symbols
only operate on and return terms of base type.
Terms are deﬁned as names, variables, and function sym-
bols applied to other terms. Let N ⊆ N and X ⊆ X , the set
of terms built from N and X by applying function symbols
in Σ is denoted by T (Σ,N∪X). Of course function symbol
application must respect sorts and arities. We write fv(u)
(resp. fn(u)) for the set of variables (resp. names) occurring
in a term u. A term is ground if it does not contain any
variable.
To model algebraic properties of cryptographic primitives,
we deﬁne an equational theory by a ﬁnite set E of equations
u = v with u, v ∈ T (Σ,X ), i.e. u, v do not contain names.
We deﬁne =E to be the smallest equivalence relation on
terms, that contains E and that is closed under application
of function symbols and substitutions of terms for variables.
Example 1: Consider the following signature Σ0:
{sdec, senc, adec, aenc, pk, 〈 〉, proj1, proj2, sign, check, vk, h}
The function symbols sdec, senc (resp. adec and aenc) of
arity 2 represent symmetric (resp. asymmetric) decryption
and encryption. Pairing is modelled using a symbol of
arity 2, denoted 〈 〉, and projection functions denoted
proj1 and proj2. We consider also signatures and hashes. A
signature can be checked using check when the veriﬁcation
key is known and this operator also allows one to retrieve
the signed message. We denote by pk(sk) (resp. vk(sk))
the public key (resp. the veriﬁcation key) associated to the
private key sk . Moreover, we consider that the function
symbols pk and vk take as argument a term of type seed.
Then, we consider the equational theory E0, deﬁned by
the following equations (i ∈ {1, 2}):
sdec(senc(x, y), y) = x adec(aenc(x, pk(y)), y) = x
proji(〈x1, x2〉) = xi check(sign(x, y), vk(y)) = x
Let u1 = senc(proj2(〈a, b〉), k) and u2 = senc(b, k). We
have that the terms u1 and u2 are equal modulo E0, written
u1 =E0 u2, while obviously the syntactic equality u1 = u2
does not hold.
B. Processes
Plain processes are built up in a similar way to plain
processes in applied pi calculus. The grammar of the plain
processes is as follows:
P,Q := 0
P | Q
new n.P
!P
if u1 = u2 then P else Q
in(u, x).P
out(u, v).Q
where u is a term of channel type (i.e. a name or a variable),
u1, u2 are terms having the same type, x is a variable, v is a
term, and n is a name. The terms u1, u2 and v may contain
variables.
As usual, names and variables have scopes, which are
delimited by restrictions and by inputs. We write fv(P ),
bv(P ), fn(P ) and bn(P ) for the sets of free and bound
variables, and free and bound names of a plain process P
respectively.
Extended processes add a set of restricted names E , and
a sequence of messages Φ.
Deﬁnition 1: An extended process A is a triple (E ;P; Φ):
• E is a set of names that represents the names that are
restricted in P and Φ;
• P is a multiset of plain processes where null processes
are removed and such that fv(P) = ∅;
• Φ = {w1  u1, . . . , wn  un} where u1, . . . , un are
ground terms, and w1, . . . , wn are variables.
We write dom(Φ) the domain of Φ, i.e. dom(Φ) =
{w1, . . . , wn}. We write fn(A) and bn(A) for the sets of
free and bound names of an extended process A. Given
A = (E ;P; Φ), we have that fn(A) = fn(P)  E , and
bn(A) = bn(P) ∪ E .
For sake of clarity, we often omit brackets and the null
process. For instance, we write k1, out(c, u) instead of
{k1} and {out(c, u).0}. When there is no “else”, it means
“else 0”; and we sometimes write
if (u1 = u2 ∧ u′1 = u
′
2) then P else Q
instead of nested conditionals. Moreover, we often write P
instead of (∅;P ; ∅).
Example 2: As an illustrative example, consider the pro-
cess Ai = new skS .(Pi | Q) that has been informally
introduced in Section I. We have that:
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(E ; {if u = v then Q1 else Q2} unionmulti P; Φ)
τ
−→ (E ;Q1 unionmulti P; Φ) if u =E v (THEN)
(E ; {if u = v then Q1 else Q2} unionmulti P; Φ)
τ
−→ (E ;Q2 unionmulti P; Φ) if u =E v (ELSE)
(E ; {out(p, u).Q1;in(p, x).Q2} unionmulti P; Φ)
τ
−→ (E ;Q1 unionmultiQ2{x → u} unionmulti P; Φ) (COMM)
(E ; {in(p, x).Q} unionmulti P; Φ) in(p,M)−−−−−→ (E ;Q{x → u} unionmulti P; Φ) (IN)
if p ∈ E , MΦ = u, fv(M) ⊆ dom(Φ) and fn(M) ∩ E = ∅
(E ; {out(p, u).Q} unionmulti P; Φ)
νwn.out(p,wn)
−−−−−−−−−→ (E ;Q unionmulti P; Φ ∪ {wn  u}) (OUT-T)
if p ∈ E , u is a term of base type, and wn is a variable such that n = |Φ|+ 1
(E ; {out(p, c).Q} unionmulti P; Φ)
out(p,c)
−−−−−→ (E ;Q unionmulti P; Φ) if p, c ∈ E (OUT-CH)
(E ; {out(p, c).Q} unionmulti P; Φ)
νchn.out(p,chn)
−−−−−−−−−−→ (E ; (Q unionmulti P){c → chn}; Φ) (OPEN-CH)
if p ∈ E , c ∈ E , chn is a fresh channel name
(E ; {new k.Q} unionmulti P; Φ)
τ
−→ (E ∪ {n};Q{k → n} unionmulti P; Φ) (NEW)
if n is a fresh name with the same type as k
(E ; {!Q} unionmulti P; Φ)
τ
−→ (E ; {!Q;Q} unionmulti P; Φ) (REPL)
(E ; {P1 | P2} unionmulti P; Φ)
τ
−→ (E ; {P1, P2} unionmulti P; Φ) (PAR)
where p, c are channel names, u, v are ground terms, and x is a variable.
Figure 1. Semantics
• Pi = new r.out(c, aenc(〈r, id i〉, pk(skS))), and
• Q = in(c, x).out(c, proj2(adec(x, skS))).
The ﬁrst component generates a fresh random number r,
publishes the message aenc(〈r, id i〉, pk(skS)) containing its
identity id i by sending it on the public channel c. The second
component receives a message on c, uses the private key skS
to decrypt it, and sends the second part of the resulting
plaintext on c.
The semantics is given by a set of labelled rules (see
Figure 1) that allows one to reason about processes that
interact with their environment. This deﬁnes the relation −→
where  is either an input, an output, or a silent action τ .
Note that the sent messages of base type are exclusively
stored in the frame and not in the labels (the outputs are
made by “reference”).
Example 3: Let Ai be the extended process deﬁned in
Example 2. We have that:
Ai
τ
−→
τ
−→
τ
−→
νw1.out(c,w1)
−−−−−−−−−→ ({skS , r};Q;w1  aenc(〈r, id i〉, pk(skS)))
in(c,w1)
−−−−−→ ({skS , r};out(c,Mi);w1  aenc(〈r, id i〉, pk(skS)))
νw2.out(c,w2)
−−−−−−−−−→ ({skS , r}; 0; Φi)
def
= A′i
with Mi = proj2(adec(aenc(〈r, id i〉, pk(skS)), skS)) and
Φi = {w1  aenc(〈r, id i〉, pk(sks)), w2  Mi}. Note that
Mi =E0 id i.
The three ﬁrst steps are performed using the rules NEW
and PAR. Then, we used the rules OUT-T and IN. We denote
by A′i the resulting extended process.
Notations: Let A be the alphabet of actions (in our case
this alphabet is inﬁnite and contains the special symbol τ ).
For every w ∈ A∗, the relation w−→ on processes is deﬁned
in the usual way. For s ∈ (A  {τ})∗, the relation s⇒ on
processes is deﬁned by: A s⇒ B if, and only if there exists
w ∈ A∗ such that A w−→ B and s is obtained by erasing all
occurrences of τ .
III. FORMALISING PRIVACY-TYPE SECURITY PROPERTIES
Many interesting security properties, in particular privacy-
type properties such as those studied in [27], [5], [28], are
formalised using behavioural equivalence. We will review
some of them in Section III-B using the notion of trace
equivalence.
A. Trace equivalence
Before deﬁning trace equivalence, we introduce the notion
of static equivalence that compares sequences of messages,
a notion of intruder’s knowledge that has been extensively
studied (e.g. [29]).
To represent the knowledge of an attacker (who may have
observed a sequence of messages u1, . . . , un, we use the
concept of frame. A frame φ = new E .Φ consists of a ﬁnite
set E of restricted names (those unknown to the attacker),
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and a substitution Φ of the form:
{w1  u1, . . . , wn  un} with dom(Φ) = {w1, . . . , wn}
The variables enable us to refer to each ui and we always
assume that the terms ui are ground. The names E are bound
in φ and can be renamed. Moreover names that do not appear
in Φ can be added or removed from E . In particular, we
can always assume that two frames share the same set of
restricted names.
Two frames are considered equivalent when the attacker
cannot detect the difference between the two situations they
represent, that is, his ability to distinguish whether two
recipes M and N produce the same term does not depend
on the frame.
Deﬁnition 2: We say that two frames φ1 = new E .Φ1 and
φ2 = new E .Φ2 are statically equivalent, φ1 ∼ φ2, when
dom(Φ1) = dom(Φ2), and for all terms M,N such that
fn(M,N) ∩ E = ∅, we have that MΦ1 =E NΦ1, if and
only if, MΦ2 =E NΦ2.
Example 4: Let A′1 (resp. A′2) be the extended process
described in Example 3 and φ1 (resp. φ2) be its associated
frame, i.e. φi = new {skS , r}.Φi with i ∈ {1, 2}. We
have that φ1 ∼ φ2. Indeed, the test w2
?
= id1 can be used
to distinguish the two frames. The test holds in φ1 since
w2Φ1 = M1 =E0 id1, whereas it does not hold in φ2 since
w2Φ2 = M2 =E0= id2 =E0 id1. However, we have that:
new {sks, r}.{w1  aenc(〈r, id1〉, pk(skS))}
∼
new {skS , r}.{w1  aenc(〈r, id2〉, pk(skS))}.
For every extended process A = (E ;P; Φ), we deﬁne its
set of traces, each trace consisting in a sequence of actions
together with the sequence of sent messages:
trace(A) = {(tr,new E ′.Φ′) | A tr⇒ (E ′;P ′; Φ′)
for some process (E ′;P ′; Φ′)}.
Two processes are trace equivalent if, whatever the mes-
sages they received (built upon previously sent messages),
the resulting sequences of messages are in static equivalence.
Deﬁnition 3: Let A and B be two extended processes,
A  B if for every (tr, φ) ∈ trace(A) such that bn(tr) ∩
fn(B) = ∅, there exists (tr′, φ′) ∈ trace(B) such that
tr = tr′ and φ ∼ φ′. Two closed extended processes A
and B are trace equivalent, denoted by A ≈ B, if A  B
and B  A.
Example 5: Consider the following trace:
tr = νw1.out(c, w1) · in(c, w1) · νw2.out(c, w2).
We have that (tr, φ1) ∈ trace(A1), and the only trace
(tr′, φ′) ∈ trace(A2) that satisﬁes tr = tr′ leads to the
frame φ2 for which we have seen that φ1 ∼ φ2 (see
Example 4). This allows us to conclude that A1 ≈ A2.
B. Some examples
The deﬁnitions we present here are informal ones, and
we refer the reader to [5] for detailed formal deﬁnitions. In
Section VI, we will illustrate these deﬁnitions through the
e-passport application.
Strong anonymity: Anonymity is informally deﬁned by
the ISO/IEC standard 15408 [30] as the property ensuring
that a user may use a service or a resource without disclos-
ing the user’s identity. Formally, strong anonymity has been
deﬁned to hold [5] when an outside observer cannot tell the
difference between a system in which the user with a public
known identity id0 executes the analysed protocol, from the
system where id0 is not present at all.
Following this formal deﬁnition of anonymity, the pro-
tocol introduced in Section I considered in isolation, i.e.
P = new r.out(c, aenc(〈r, id〉, pk(skS))), is said to satisfy
strong anonymity if the following equivalence holds:
new skS . ((!new id . !P ) | !P{id0/id})
≈
new skS .(!new id . !P )
In other words, anonymity is satisﬁed if an observer
cannot tell if the user id0 (known to the attacker) has been
executing the protocol P or not.
Strong unlinkability: Unlinkability is informally de-
ﬁned by the ISO/IEC standard 15408 [30] as the property
ensuring that a user may make multiple uses of a service
or a resource without others being able to link these uses
together. Formally, strong unlinkability has been deﬁned to
hold [5] when a system in which the analysed protocol can
be executed by each user multiple times looks the same to
an outside observer that the system in which the analysed
protocol can be executed by each user at most once.
Again, we can formalise this property for the protocol P
when considered in isolation using an equivalence:
new skS . (!new id . !P ) ≈ new skS .(!new id . P )
In other words, unlinkability is satisﬁed if an observer cannot
tell if the users can execute multiple or at most once the
protocol P .
IV. COMPOSITION RESULT: A SIMPLE SETTING
Even if a protocol is secure for an unbounded number of
sessions, there is no guarantee if the protocol is executed in
an environment where other protocols sharing some common
keys are executed. The interaction with the other protocols
may dramatically damage the security of the former proto-
col. This is a well-known fact that has been already observed
for trace-based security properties e.g. [16], [17], and that
remains true for privacy-type properties.
An attacker may take advantage of a protocol Q to break
anonymity of another protocol P that has been proved secure
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in isolation. This can happen for instance if the security
of P relies on the secrecy of a particular shared key that is
revealed by the protocol Q.
A. Sharing primitives
Actually, even if shared keys are not revealed, the in-
teraction of two protocols using common primitives may
compromise their security.
Example 6: Consider the processes Pi with i ∈ {1, 2}
as deﬁned in Example 2. The equivalence expressing the
anonymity of P (for one session) holds. We have that
new skS .P1 ≈ new skS .P2 whereas the equivalence ex-
pressing the anonymity of P in presence of Q does not
hold anymore. We have that:
new skS .
(
P1 | Q
)
≈ new skS .
(
P2 | Q
)
Intuitively, the security of P is ensured by the fact that its
identity id is encrypted using the public key pk(skS) whose
associated private key skS is kept secret. However, Q can
be used as an oracle to decrypt a ciphertext that comes from
the process P , and thus Q can be used to reveal the identity
hidden in the ciphertext.
To avoid a ciphertext from a process to be decrypted by
another one, we can consider processes that use disjoint
primitives. However, this is an unnecessarily restrictive
condition. So, we consider protocols that may share some
cryptographic primitives provided they are tagged.
Tagging is a syntactic transformation that consists in
assigning to each protocol an identiﬁer (e.g. the protocol’s
name) that should appear in any encrypted message. Many
relevant equational theories are not so easy to tag (e.g.
exclusive or). So, we consider the ﬁx common equational
theory (Σ0,E0) deﬁned in Example 1, and we explain how
to transform any process built on a signature Σ (possibly
larger that Σ0) into a well-tagged process. For this, we deﬁne
Σtag
c
= {tagc, untagc} where tagc and untagc are two
function symbols of arity 1 that we will use for tagging.
The role of the tagc function is to tag its argument with
the tag c. The role of the untagc function is to remove the
tag. To model this interaction between tagc and untagc, we
consider the equational theory:
Etag
c
= {untagc(tagc(x)) = x}.
For our composition result, we will assume that the
processes PA and PB that we want to compose are built
on (Σa ∪ Σ0,Ea ∪ E0) and (Σb ∪ Σ0,Eb ∪ E0), where
(Σa,Ea), (Σb,Eb) and (Σ0,E0) are disjoint signatures that
are also disjoint from (Σtag
a
,Etag
a
) and (Σtag
b
,Etag
b
). The
signature Σ0 contains the function symbols that can be used
by the two processes and that have to be tagged. We denote
by Σ+c = Σc ∪ Σtagc and E
+
c = Ec ∪ Etagc with c ∈ {a, b}.
Deﬁnition 4: Let u be a term built on Σc ∪ Σ0 (c ∈
{a, b}). The c-tagged version of u, denoted [u]c is deﬁned
as follows:
[senc(u, v)]c
def
= senc(tagc([u]c), [v]c)
[aenc(u, v)]c
def
= aenc(tagc([u]c), [v]c)
[sign(u, v)]c
def
= sign(tagc([u]c), [v]c)
[h(u)]c
def
= h(tagc([u]c))
[sdec(u, v)]c
def
= untagc(sdec([u]c, [v]c))
[adec(u, v)]c
def
= untagc(adec([u]c, [v]c))
[check(u, v)]c
def
= untagc(check([u]c, [v]c))
[f(u1, . . . , un)]c
def
= f([u1]c, . . . , [un]c) otherwise.
Note that we do not tag the pairing function symbol
(this is actually useless), and we do not tag the pk and vk
function symbols. Actually, tagging pk and vk would greatly
help us to establish our results and would also avoid us to
introduce some additional assumptions, but this would lead
us to consider an unrealistic modelling for asymmetric keys.
Some of the difﬁculties encountered with asymmetric keys
will be discussed in Section V.
Example 7: Consider ui = aenc(〈r, id i〉, pk(skS)) with
i ∈ {1, 2} and v = proj2(adec(x, skS)). We have that
[ui]a = aenc(taga(〈r, id i〉), pk(skS)), whereas [v]b =
proj2(untagb(adec(x, skS))).
Before extending the notion of tagging to processes, we
have to express the tests that are performed by an agent when
he receives a message that is supposed to be tagged. This
is the purpose of testc(u) that represents the tests which
ensure that every projection and every untagging performed
by an agent during the computation of u is successful.
Deﬁnition 5: Let u be a term built on Σ+c ∪Σ0 with c ∈
{a, b}. We deﬁne testc(u) as follows:
testc(u)
def
= testc(u1) ∧ testc(u2) ∧ tagc(untagc(u)) = u
when u = g(u1, u2) with g ∈ {sdec, adec, check}
testc(u)
def
= testc(u1) ∧ u1 = 〈proj1(u1), proj2(u1)〉
when u = proji(u1) with i ∈ {1, 2}
testc(u)
def
= true when u is a name or a variable
testc(u)
def
= testc(u1) ∧ . . . ∧ testc(un) otherwise.
Example 8: Again, consider ui = aenc(〈r, id i〉, pk(skS))
with i ∈ {1, 2} and v = proj2(adec(x, skS)). We have that:
testa([ui]a) = true
testb([v]b) = tagb(untagb(adec(x, skS))) = adec(x, skS)
∧ proj1(v
′), proj2(v
′)〉 = v′
where v′ = untagb(adec(x, skS)).
Let A = (E ;P; Φ) be a process built on Σc ∪ Σ0 with
c ∈ {a, b} such that P = {P1, . . . , P}, and Φ = {w1 
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u1, . . . , wn  un}. The c-tagged version of the process A,
denoted [A]c, is the process (E ; [P]c; [Φ]c) where [P]c =
{[P1]c, . . . , [P]c}, and
[Φ]c = {w1  [u1]c, . . . , wn  [un]c}.
For plain processes, the transformation [P ]c is deﬁned as
follows:
[0]c
def
= 0 [!P ]c
def
= ![P ]c [new k.P ]c
def
= new k.[P ]c
[P | Q]c
def
= [P ]c | [Q]c [in(u, x).P ]c
def
= in(u, x).[P ]c
[out(u, v).Q]c
def
= if testc([v]c) then out(u, [v]c).[Q]c
[if u1 = u2 then P else Q]c
def
=
if ϕ then (if [u1]c = [u2]c then [P ]c else [Q]c)
else 0
where ϕ = testc([u1]c) ∧ testc([u2]c)
Roughly, instead of simply outputting a term v, a process
will ﬁrst performed some tests to check that the term is
correctly tagged and he will output its c-tagged version [v]c.
For a conditional, the process will ﬁrst check that the
terms u1 and u2 are correctly tagged before checking that
the test is satisﬁed.
Example 9: Consider the processes Pi and Q deﬁned in
Example 2.
[Pi]a = new r.out(c, aenc(taga(〈r, id i〉), pk(skS)))
[Q]b = in(c, x).if testb([v]b) thenout(c, [v]b)
where [v]b (resp. testb([v]b)) have been deﬁned in Example 7
(resp. Example 8).
Note that the tag will prevent the process Q to decrypt the
ciphertext that has been output by Pi. Thus, the equivalence
expressing the anonymity of [Pi]a now holds even in the
presence of [Q]b. We have that:
new skS .
(
[P1]a | [Q]b) ≈ new skS .
(
[P2]a | [Q]b).
This a is non-trivial equivalence that can actually be derived
from the equivalence new skS .[P1]a ≈ new skS .[P2]a using
our composition result (Corollary 1).
B. Composition context
As already mentioned, we want to establish a composition
result between processes that share the signature (Σ0,E0)
and also share some keys. Thus, we introduce the notion of
composition context that will help us to describe under which
keys the composition has to be done. Note that a composition
context may contain several holes, parallel operators, and
nested replications. This is needed to express privacy-type
properties as those described in Section III-B.
Deﬁnition 6: A composition context C is deﬁned by the
following grammar where n is a name of base type.
C,C1, C2 := | new n. C | !C | C1|C2
We only allow names of base type (typically keys) to be
shared between processes through the composition context.
In particular, they are not allowed to share a private channel
even if each process can used its own private channels
to communicate internally. We also suppose w.l.o.g. that
names occurring in C are distinct. A composition context
may contain several holes. We can index them to avoid
confusion. We write C[P1, . . . , P] (or shortly C[P ]) the
process obtained by ﬁlling the ith hole with the process Pi
(or the ith process of the sequence P ). We will also use
P | Q to represent the sequence of processes obtained by
putting in parallel the processes of the sequences P and Q
componentwise.
Example 10: In Section III-B, we have seen that unlink-
ability of P can be modelled using the equivalence:
new skS .
(
!new id .!P
)
≈ new skS .
(
!new id .P
)
.
The composition contexts used to express this property are:
• C[ ] = new skS .
(
!new id . !
)
, and
• C ′[ ] = new skS .
(
!new id .
)
.
Since the name id does not occur in the process Q (see
Example 2), it is quite easy to see that C[Q] ≈ C ′[Q].
Unlinkability of P in presence of the process Q will be
modelled as C[P | Q] ≈ C ′[P | Q], which is equivalent to:
new skS .!
(
(new id .!P ) | Q
)
≈ new skS .!
(
(new id .P
)
| Q
)
Note that in a composition context a replication may occur
in the scope of some restrictions and this is needed to express
many interesting privacy-type properties. Considering com-
position in a simpler setting where only a bounded number
of keys k˜ are shared (as done in e.g. [31]), would not allow
us to establish unlinkability in a modular way, but only some
results of the form:
new k˜.P1 ≈ new k˜.P2 ⇒
new k˜. (P1 | Q) ≈ new k˜. (P2 | Q)
assuming that processes P1, P2, and Q satisfy some addi-
tional conditions.
Now, we have introduce composition under replication,
but have to formalise the notion of revealing a shared key.
The names that occur in the composition context represent
the names that are shared between the two processes that
we want to compose. Since those names may occur under
a replication, we have to consider renaming and formalise
this notion of revealing accordingly.
Deﬁnition 7: Let C be a composition context, A be an
extended process of the form (E ;C[P1, . . . , P]; Φ), and
key ∈ {n, pk(n), vk(n) | n ∈ E or n occurs in C}. We say
that the extended process A reveals the shared key key when:
Either fn(key) ∈ E , and
• A
w
⇒ (E ′;P ′; Φ′) for some (E ′;P ′; Φ′); and
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• MΦ′ =E key for some M such that fv(M) ⊆ dom(Φ′)
and fn(M) ∩ E ′ = ∅.
Or, we have that fn(key) occurs in C, the i0th hole is in the
scope of new fn(key), and
• (E ∪ {s};C[P+1 , . . . , P
+
 ]; Φ)
w
⇒ (E ′;P ′; Φ′) with
P+i0
def
= Pi0 | in(c, x).if x = key thenout(c, s)
and P+i
def
= Pi if i = i0; and
• MΦ′ =E s for some M such that fv(M) ⊆ dom(Φ′)
and fn(M) ∩ E ′ = ∅.
Example 11: Consider the composition context C[ ] =
new skS . . The extended process (∅;C[P ]; ∅) with P
as described in Section III-B does not reveal the
keys skS , pk(skS) and vk(skS). Indeed, let key ∈
{skS , pk(skS), vk(skS)}, we have that
({s};C[P | in(c, x).if x = key thenout(c, s)]; ∅)
can not reached a conﬁguration from which s will be
derivable by the attacker.
C. Going back to the disjoint case
It is well-know that parallel composition works when
processes do not share any secret, the so-called disjoint case.
A ﬁrst idea to establish a composition result is to see under
which conditions we can go back to the disjoint case. In
this section, we will see that this is indeed possible provided
that processes are tagged and only share some keys that will
never be revealed.
Theorem 1: Let C be a composition context, and PA
(resp. PB) be two sequences of plain processes built
on the signature Σa ∪ Σ0 (resp Σb ∪ Σ0). Assume
that C[[PA]a] and C[[PB ]b] do not reveal any key in
{k, pk(k), vk(k) | k occurs in C}. We have that:
C[[PA]a | [PB ]b] ≈ C[[PA]a] | C[[PB ]b].
Proof: (sketch) Consider S = (∅;C[[PA]a | [PB ]b]; ∅)
and D = (∅;C[[PA]a] | C[[PB ]b]; ∅). Actually, we can show
that any trace (tr, φD) ∈ trace(D) can be mapped to a trace
(tr, φS) ∈ trace(S) such that φD ∼ φS and conversely.
Note that even if the resulting frames φS and φD are not
syntactically equal, we can show that they are in static
equivalence and the computation performed by the attacker
in both executions are exactly the same, namely tr.
For this, we consider the transformation δ (c ∈
{a, b}) on terms whose purpose is to replace the oc-
currences of the shared keys that are used in PB by
some fresh names in order to ensure disjointness. How-
ever, we do not want to replace any occurrence of a
shared key. For instance, assume that the following term
u = senc(tagb(senc(taga(na), k)), k) has been output by
the process PB = in(c, x).out(c, senc(tagb(x), k)). The
purpose of δ is to replace the occurrences of the shared k
that “come from PB” by a fresh key k′. Actually, we have
that:
δ(u) = senc(tagb(senc(taga(na), k)), k
′).
Then the proof can go through thanks to some nice
properties that are enjoyed by this transformation δ. In
particular, we have that:
• this transformation preserves the equality tests per-
formed by each process: “δ(u) = δ(v) ⇔ u = v”.
• this transformation preserves deducibility in the sense
that for any message u that the attacker can obtained
from φS , we can show that its counterpart δ(u) can be
obtained using “δ(φS) = φD” using the same recipe
(and conversely).
This result as well as the way we proceed to prove it are
close to the one proved in [17]. However, we generalise it
in several ways. First, we combine the results of [17] so
that we are able to deal with disjoint equational theories
together with a common equational theory. Moreover, for
the common theory, we consider also pairing and asymmet-
ric primitives. Due to the way tagging is performed, the
asymmetric primitives add some difﬁculties. Second, since
we want a composition result for trace equivalence, we have
to map any trace of D to a trace of S (and conversely),
and we have also to ensure that the resulting sequence of
messages are in static equivalence. Third, we consider a
process algebra that allows us to express disequality tests
(i.e. non-trivial else branches).
Note that, we have to ensure that shared keys are never
revealed. This is needed for symmetric keys, but as men-
tioned in the hypothesis of the proposition, this is also
required for public keys and veriﬁcation keys. As we will see
in Example 14, this hypothesis is necessary for this result
to hold, but we will show how to relax it and still get a
composition result (see Section V).
D. A ﬁrst composition result
The result stated in Theorem 1 allows us to go back to
the disjoint case for which composition works quite well.
Hence, as a corollary, we are now able to state our ﬁrst
composition result.
Corollary 1: Let C and C ′ be two composition con-
texts. Let PA, P ′A (resp. PB , P ′B) be two sequences
of plain processes built on the signature Σa ∪ Σ0
(resp. Σb ∪ Σ0). Assume that C[[PA]a] and C[[PB ]b]
(resp. C ′[[P ′A]a] and C ′[[P ′B ]b]) do not reveal any
shared key in {k, pk(k), vk(k) | k occurs in C} (resp.
{k, pk(k), vk(k) | k occurs in C ′}). We have that:
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C[[PA]a] ≈ C
′[[P ′A]a]
C[[PB ]b] ≈ C
′[[P ′B ]b]
C[[PA]a | [PB ]b] ≈ C
′[[P ′A]a | [P
′
B ]b]
Proof: (sketch) This composition result is proved in
three main steps.
1) We have that the equivalences C[[PA]a] ≈ C ′[[P ′A]a]
and C[[PB ]b] ≈ C ′[[P ′B ]b] hold on the signatures
(Σ+a ∪ Σ0,E
+
a ∪ E0) and (Σ+b ∪ Σ0,E
+
b ∪ E0) re-
spectively. It is relatively easy to show that the same
equivalences also hold on the augmented signature
(Σ+a ∪ Σ
+
b ∪ Σ0,E
+
a ∪ E
+
b ∪ E0).
2) Then, relying on these two equivalences, we can show
that:
C[[PA]a] | C[[PB ]b] ≈ C
′[[P ′A]a] | C
′[[P ′B ]b].
This corresponds to composition in the disjoint case
(no shared key). This is a well-know fact that actually
holds in many cryptographic calculus.
3) Then, we apply Theorem 1 on both sides of the
equivalence, and we obtain the expected result:
C[[PA]a | [PB ]b] ≈ C
′[[P ′A]a | [P
′
B ]b].
V. COMPOSITION IN PRESENCE OF PROCESSES THAT
REVEAL SHARED KEYS
In the previous section, we presented a ﬁrst composition
result. However, this result does not hold as soon as some
shared keys are revealed: such a key can be a symmetric
shared key, the private part of an asymmetric key pair, but
also the public part of an asymmetric key pair. In this section,
we will see that we can relax this condition by allowing
shared keys to be revealed from the beginning.
A. Some additional difﬁculties
First, as shown by the example below, we do not want
public keys to be revealed (for the ﬁrst time) during the
execution of the protocol.
Example 12: We consider a slightly different version of
the process Pi introduced in Example 2. Basically, we
remove the random r inside the encryption and we consider
its well-tagged version. We consider the following processes:
[P ′i ]a
def
= out(c, aenc(taga(id i), pk(skS))) i ∈ {1, 2}
Consider the composition context C[ ] = new skS . .
Note that, the equivalence C[[P ′1]a] ≈ C[[P ′2]a] still holds in
this setting. Assume now that [P ′i ]a is executed in presence
of the well-tagged process Qpk = out(c, pk(skS)). Clearly,
the equivalence expressing the anonymity of [P ′i ]a does not
hold anymore. We have that:
C[[P ′1]a | Q
pk] ≈ C[[P ′2]a | Q
pk].
Actually, the knowledge of pk(skS) will allow the attacker
to distinguish the message emitted by [P ′1]a from the one
emitted by [P ′2]a.
To avoid the problem mentioned above, we will assume
that shared keys that are revealed have to be revealed from
the very beginning. This hypothesis seems indeed reasonable
since the purpose of a public key is in general to be disclosed
at the beginning, or eventually never revealed to an outsider.
Note that the previous example is not a counter-example
anymore if we analyse the equivalence expressing the
anonymity of [P ′i ]a assuming that pk(skS) is known by
the attacker from the beginning. The fact that pk(skS) is
revealed during the execution of Qpk will not give any
additional power to the attacker.
Example 13: We consider again the process Pi as pre-
sented in Example 2 with an additional output to reveal the
public key pk(skS) at the very beginning. Basically, we con-
sider the well-tagged process P ′′i
def
= out(c, pk(skS)).[Pi]a.
We have that C[P ′′1 ] ≈ C[P ′′2 ] with C[ ] = new skS . .
Now, the presence of Qpk will not prevent this equivalence
to hold. Indeed, we have that:
C[P ′′1 | Q
pk] ≈ C[P ′′2 | Q
pk].
This hypothesis that states that shared keys are either
known from the beginning or never revealed during the
execution of the protocol is reasonable, and seems to be
sufﬁcient to establish a composition result. However, this
complicates a bit the setting. In particular, as illustrated in
Example 14, there is no hope to obtain a result as the one
stated in Theorem 1. The situation where the processes share
some keys is not equivalent in this setting to the situation
where the processes do not share any key.
Example 14: Consider the processes P ′′i and Qpk used
in Example 13. We have seen that composition works under
the composition context C = new skS . . However, we have
that (i ∈ {1, 2}):
C[P ′′i | Q
pk] ≈ C[P ′′i ] | C[Q
pk].
Indeed, on the left-hand side, the same public-key will be
output twice whereas the process on the right-hand side will
emit two different public keys. The attacker will observe
such a difference. The strong result stated in Theorem 1
allowing us to easily make the ling between the joint state
case and the disjoint case does not hold anymore.
The problems encountered for composing processes that
reveal shared keys are due to the fact that we do not want to
tag the function symbols pk and vk that are used to model
asymmetric keys: such a tagging scheme would lead us to
an unrealistic modelling of asymmetric keys.
9
B. Composition result
We now consider public keys and veriﬁcations keys that
can be made public from the beginning through an initial
frame Φ0 that will represent the initial knowledge of the
attacker. As illustrated in Section V-A, we cannot rely on
Theorem 1 anymore to establish our composition result. We
will still go back to the disjoint case but we have to explain
how a trace corresponding to the situation where processes
share some keys is transformed and mapped to a trace
that models the disjoint case. We cannot simply consider
the identity transformation as it was done to establish the
previous result. The sets of traces issued from both situations
are not the same anymore.
Theorem 2: Let PA, P ′A (resp. PB, P ′B) be two sequences
of plain processes built Σa ∪Σ0 (resp. Σb ∪Σ0). Let K0 be
a ﬁnite set of names of base type, and C and C ′ be two
composition contexts. Let Φ0 = {w1  f1(k1), . . . , wn 
fn(kn)} with fi ∈ {pk, vk}, and ki ∈ K0 for any i ∈
{1, . . . , n}.
Assume that (K0;C[[PA]a]; Φ0) and (K0;C[[PB ]b]; Φ0)
(resp. (K0;C[[P ′A]a]; Φ0), and (K0;C[[P ′B ]b]; Φ0)):
• do not reveal any key in {k, pk(k), vk(k) | k ∈ K0}
unless if the key occurs explicitly in Φ0; and
• do not reveal any shared key in C (resp. C ′);
Lastly, we assume that processes PA, P ′A and PB , P ′B do
not use variable of channel type. We have that:
(K0;C[[PA]a]; Φ0) ≈ (K0;C
′[[P ′A]a]; Φ0)
(K0;C[[PB ]b]; Φ0) ≈ (K0;C ′[[P ′B ]b]; Φ0)
(K0;C[[PA]a | [PB ]b]; Φ0) ≈ (K0;C
′[[P ′A]a | [P
′
B ]b]; Φ0)
Proof: (sketch) Actually, the two ﬁrst steps are quite
similar to the two ﬁrst steps of the proof of Corollary 1, but
we renamed the channel names that occur in PA, P ′A (resp.
PB , P ′B) before to compose these processes. This, together
with our additional hypothesis on the variables of channel
type, will allow us to identify easily whether a given action
has been performed by PA or PB (resp. P ′A or P ′B).
Then, consider a trace (tr, φS) issued from S =
(K0;C[[PA]a | [PB ]b]; Φ0). First, we show that a similar
trace (tr′, φD) is also issued from D = (K0;C[[PA]a] |
C[[PB ]b]; Φ0) (where channel names have been renamed).
Actually, the processes along these two traces will be very
similar (up to a transformation similar to the δ transforma-
tion used in the proof of Corollary 1 and a renaming on
the channel names) but the labels involved in tr′ have to be
changed. Indeed, as soon as a message u will involved a pub-
lic key in a “deducible position”, the attacker will not be able
to produce u and δ(u) using the same recipe. The way the
recipe has to be changed depends in particular on whether
the action has been made by PA or PB . Second, relying on
our hypothesis, we know that there exists (tr′, φ′D) issued
from D′ = (K0;C ′[[P ′A]a] | C ′[[P ′B ]b]; Φ0) (where again
channel names have been renamed). However, to conclude,
we have to go back to the process S′ = (K0;C ′[[P ′A]a |
[P ′B ]b]; Φ0). This can be done by applying the reverse of the
transformation δ on each process that occurs in the trace,
but again the labels that occur in tr′ have to be changed.
Moreover, we have to ensure that this change will allow
one to retrieve the original sequence tr. For this, we use the
fact that the actions of PA (resp. PB) are mimicked by P ′A
(resp. P ′B) (this is enforced by the way we have renamed
channel names). Actually, some complications appear when
an internal communication is performed on a public channel
(this is indeed allowed by the semantics), but this problem
can be solved by replacing such an internal step with two
visible actions (an output followed by an input) having a
clearly identiﬁable origin.
VI. APPLICATION: E-PASSPORT
We illustrate the usefulness of our composition results
on the e-passport application. An electronic passport (or e-
passport) is a paper passport with an RFID chip that stores
the critical information printed on the passport. The Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) standard [32]
speciﬁes the communication protocols that are used to access
these information.
A. Protocols description
The information stored in the chip is organised in data
groups (dg1 to dg19). For example, dg5 contains a JPEG
copy of the displayed picture, and dg7 contains the displayed
signature. The veriﬁcation key vk(skP ) of the passport,
together with its certiﬁcate sign(vk(skP ), skDS ) issued by
the Document Signer authority are stored in dg15. The
corresponding signing key skP is stored in a tamper resistant
memory, and cannot be read or copied. For authentication
purposes, a hash of all the dgs together with a signature on
this hash value issued by the Document Signer authority are
stored in a separate ﬁle, the Security Object Document:
sod
def
= 〈sign(h(dg1, . . . , dg19), skDS ), h(dg1, . . . , dg19)〉.
The ICAO standard speciﬁes several protocols through
which these information can be accessed. First, the Basic
Access Control (BAC) protocol establishes sessions keys
ksenc and ksmac to prevent skimming and eavesdropping
on the subsequent communication with the e-passport. Once
the BAC protocol has been successfully executed, the reader
gains access to the information stored in the RFID tag
through the Passive Authentication and the Active Authen-
tication protocols that can be executed in any order (see
Figure 2).
The Passive Authentication (PA) protocol is an authentica-
tion mechanism that proves that the content of the RFID chip
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Passport Tag
ksenc, ksmac, skP
Reader
ksenc, ksmac, vk(skP )
xenc ← senc(read, ksenc)
xmac ← mac(xenc, ksmac)
〈xenc, xmac〉
yenc ← senc(〈dg
1
, . . . , dg
19
, sod〉, ksenc)
ymac ← mac(yenc, ksmac)
〈yenc, ymac〉
Passport Tag
ksenc, ksmac, skP
Reader
ksenc, ksmac, vk(skP )
new rnd
xenc ← senc(〈init, rnd〉, ksenc))
xmac ← mac(xenc, ksmac)
〈xenc, xmac〉
new nce
sigma ← sign(〈nce, rnd〉, skP )
yenc ← senc(sigma, ksenc)
ymac ← mac(yenc, ksmac)
〈yenc, ymac〉
Figure 2. Passive and Active Authentication protocols
is authentic. Through PA the reader retrieves the information
stored in the dgs and the sod . It then veriﬁes that the hash
value stored in the sod corresponds to the one signed by the
Document Signer authority. It further checks that this hash
value is consistant with the received dgs.
The Active Authentication (AA) protocol is an authentica-
tion mechanism that prevents cloning of the passport chip.
It relies on the fact that the secret key skP of the passport
cannot be read or copied. The reader sends a random
challenge to the passport, that has to return a signature on
this challenge using its private signature key skP . The reader
can then verify using the veriﬁcation key vk(skP ) that the
signature was built using the expected passport key.
B. Privacy analysis
Both protocols PA and AA rely on symmetric encryption,
message authentication codes, signatures and the veriﬁcation
key generation function, to meet their security requirements.
Note that mac(m, k) can be modelled in our setting using the
hash function symbol, i.e. mac(m, k) def= h(〈m, k〉). More-
over, the only publicly known veriﬁcation key is vk(skDS ).
Thus, we can use our composition results, and in particular
Theorem 2, to reason in a modular way about the privacy
guarantees provided by the tagged version of the e-passport
application1.
1We tried to use the ProVerif tool to prove that the e-passport application
as a whole (both PA and AA running in parallel) satisﬁes anonymity, but
it failed to terminate, reinforcing the need for techniques for modular
reasoning.
According to the ICAO standard, once the keys ksenc
and ksmac have been established (using the BAC protocol),
the reader can decide to execute PA and/or AA in any order.
Formally, this corresponds to the parallel composition of PA
and AA. We consider here that the keys ksenc and ksmac
are “securely” pre-shared. We consider an arbitrary number
of passports, each running an arbitrary number of times the
PA and the AA protocols. This situation can be modelled in
our calculus as follows:
P
def
= new skDS .
!new skP . new id . new sig. new pic. . . .
!new ksenc. new ksmac. (PA | AA)
where id, sig, pic, ... represent the name, the signature, the
displayed picture, etc of the e-passport owner, i.e. the data
stored in the dgs (1-14) and (16-19). The subprocesses PA
and AA model one session of the PA and AA protocol
respectively. The name skDS models the signing key of
the Document Signing authority used in all passports. Each
passport (identiﬁed by its signing key skP , the owner’s
name, picture, signature, ...) can run multiple times and in
any order the PA and AA protocols, but with different secret
session keys ksenc and ksmac, that should be established
through execution of the BAC protocol (but that we’ve
abstracted from).
1) Strong anonymity: To express strong anonymity as
formally deﬁned in [5] and brieﬂy discussed at Section III-B,
we will need to consider a victim’s e-passport, whose
name id0, signature sig0, picture pic0, etc. are known to
the attacker. The victim’s e-passport follows like any other e-
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passport the PA and AA protocols which can be respectively
modelled by the following processes:
PA0
def
= PA{id0/id, sig0/sig, pic0/pic, . . . }
AA0
def
= AA{id0/id, sig0/sig, pic0/pic, . . . }
To formally express strong anonymity, we will consider
the following situation:
C[ 1, 2]
def
= ! new skP . new id. new sig. new pic. . . .
! new ksenc. new ksmac. 1
| new skP . !new ksenc. new ksmac. 2
where the second hole will be ﬁlled with the processes
modelling the victim’s e-passport, while the ﬁrst hole will
be ﬁlled with the processes modelling any other e-passport.
This system will be compared to the one where the victim’s
e-passport is not present at all. For this we consider the
following situation:
C ′[ ]
def
= ! new skP . new id. new sig. new pic. . . .
! new ksenc. new ksmac.
whose unique hole will be ﬁlled with the processes mod-
elling any e-passport but the victim’s. In both situations, we
will consider that the secret key skDS is secret whereas its
associated veriﬁcation key vk(skDS ) is publicly known to the
attacker from the beginning, i.e. Φ0 = {w1  vk(skDS )}.
To check if the tagged version of the-passport application
preserves its users’ strong anonymity, one thus needs to
check if the following equivalence holds:
(skDS ;C[[PA]a | [AA]b, [PA0]a | [AA0]b]; Φ0)
≈
(skDS ;C
′[[PA]a | [AA]b]; Φ0)
Now, according to our Theorem 2, instead of checking the
above equivalence, one can check PA’s and AA’s guarantees
w.r.t. anonymity in isolation. In other words, the above equiv-
alence can be derived from the two following equivalences
that are simpler to check:
(skDS ;C[[PA]a, [PA0]a]; Φ0) ≈ (skDS ;C ′[[PA]a]; Φ0)
(skDS ;C[[AA]a, [AA0]a]; Φ0) ≈ (skDS ;C
′[[AA]a]; Φ0)
2) Strong unlinkability: To express strong unlinkability
as deﬁned in [5] and brieﬂy discussed in Section III-B, we
need on one hand to consider a system in which e-passports
can execute the PA and AA protocols multiple times, and on
the other hand a system in which e-passports can execute
the PA and AA protocols at most once. For this we consider
the two following composition contexts:
C[ ]
def
= !new skP . new id. new sig. new pic. . . .
!new ksenc. new ksmac.
C ′[ ]
def
= !new skP . new id. new sig. new pic. . . .
new ksenc. new ksmac.
These two composition contexts differ on the replication
before the generation of the session keys ksenc and ksmac,
modelling in the ﬁrst case an unbounded number of execu-
tions of the process that will ﬁll the unique hole, and in the
second a unique session of the ﬁlling process.
To check if the tagged version of the e-passport applica-
tion preserves strong unlinkability, one thus needs to check:
(skDS ;C[[PA]A|[AA]b]; Φ0)≈(skDS ;C
′[[PA]a|[AA]b]; Φ0)
We can instead check whether PA and AA satisfy unlinka-
bility in isolation:
(skDS ;C[[PA]a]; Φ0) ≈ (skDS ;C ′[[PA]a]; Φ0)
(skDS ;C[[AA]b]; Φ0) ≈ (skDS ;C
′[[AA]b]; Φ0)
Then, using Theorem 2, we derive the required equivalence.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate composition results for
privacy-type properties expressed using trace equivalence.
We have shown that secure protocols can be safely com-
posed. We consider arbitrary equational theories and we
assume that protocols may share some usual primitives
provided they are tagged. Moreover, we have to assume that
the shared keys are not revealed.
When shared keys are kept unknown during the whole
execution, we transform any trace of the composition of
two protocols under shared secrets into a trace on the
composition under no shared secrets. This allows us to go
back to the disjoint case for which composition works quite
well. However, this transformation does not work anymore
as soon as a shared key is revealed even if this key is the
public part of an asymmetric key pair, and thus cannot be
used to decrypt any ciphertext. Nevertheless, we establish
a composition result in this setting by assuming that shared
keys are either never revealed or known by the attacker from
the beginning.
For the sake of simplicity, we only consider composition
assuming that the initial knowledge of the attacker contains a
bunch of names as well as some public keys and veriﬁcation
keys. We believe that our result can be extended to allow
the attacker to have some non atomic messages in his initial
provided that they are well-tagged. Our composition result
allows one to consider public shared keys by giving them to
the attacker initially (using the frame Φ0). However, in our
setting (and in many others) such a sequence has to be ﬁnite
and thus we are only able to deal with a bounded number
of public shared keys. To relax this hypothesis, we probably
need to adapt our model. Lastly, for our composition result
to work, we have to ensure that protocols used disjoint
primitives or at least tagged them. However, real-world
security protocols, typically do not use tags, at least not
explicitly and not necessarily in the particular way stipulated
by our composition result. Thus, it would be interesting to
relax this condition. We could for instance use the implicit
disjointness criterion developed in [19].
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